


SENSITIVE

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 71113



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 13 November 1971







NSA Declassification/Release instructions on File.

For the President Only

~~*Top Secret*~~


SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1971
Weekly average for each month




AUGUST 1971 - NOVEMBER 1971
Weekly data as reported

US BATTLE DEATHS




declined from last week's eight to five.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS




increased to 136 from the 106 of last week. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.

INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE




stand at zero. The number of infiltrators noted since 1 October 1971 remains at an estimated 2,300 to 3,000.

ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS




rose sharply to 358 from last week's 249.

ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION



increased from last week's 789 to 900.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS



as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces rose to 98% from last week's 93%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

Enemy-initiated activity in South Vietnam has remained at a relatively low level during the past week and consisted largely of small attacks by fire and small-scale ground actions. One major engagement occurred in Pleiku Province on 13 November, but this was generated by South Vietnamese forces operating in hostile territory. Although the enemy maintains a strong concentration of forces along the DMZ, there are presently no indicators suggesting that any significant operation is planned for this area in the near future. For the short term, the current level and type of activity is likely to remain relatively unchanged.

North Vietnamese preparations for their annual dry season offensive in north Laos continue apace. In addition to the movement of troops, this year's preparations include the introduction of new, heavier caliber artillery pieces. The troop movement probably includes the returning 312th Division headquarters and that division's 141st Regiment, as well as reinforcements for the units already deployed northeast of the Plaine des Jarres. Some of the infiltrating groups are apparently destined for the 335th Independent Regiment operating northeast of the Royal Capital of Luang Prabang. In the past, the 335th received its replacements directly from Dien Bien Phu, but this season it has apparently joined the central personnel replacement pipeline along with the other units in Laos. Sixteen 130mm field guns, which were probably transported to north Laos between 1 and 10 November, are probably also destined for the Plaine, where they will give the enemy a significant advantage in this year's drive against General Vang Pao's irregular base at Long Tieng. These 130mm guns outrange friendly forces' 155mm howitzers by more than 10,000 meters. Consequently, friendly troops, or positions against which these 130mm guns are employed, may be unable to mount effective counter battery fire. In such circumstances, air strikes will be the only feasible Allied counter to this type of Communist artillery. In south Laos, friendly forces have successfully concluded two operations designed to keep the enemy off balance, one southwest of Saravane and the other southeast of Pakse.

Action in Cambodia during the week was highlighted by the enemy attacks in the Phnom Penh airfield area and the FANK abandonment of Rumlong on Route 6. The attacks on the airfield, nearby positions, and friendly units southwest of the capital were probably staged by the 52nd NVA Regiment which has recently moved into the area southwest of Phnom Penh. A FANK operation has been launched into the area where the 52nd NVA Regiment has been located by direction finding, but no significant contact has been reported. Meanwhile, intermittent shelling of Pochentong airfield continues. The threat to the capital and environs has also been increased by the move of a headquarters element of the Phuoc Long Front and the Headquarters, 101-D NVA Regiment, to positions near Route 5 north of Phnom Penh. Following the abortive attempts to reopen Route 6, Rumlong has been abandoned and current FANK plans call for friendly forces to keep the route open only as far south as Baray and as far north as Tang Kouk or Kruei.

Enemy Infiltration

A significant increase in truck movement through the border passes into south Laos suggests that the enemy's dry season logistics campaign was initiated on the night of 9-10 November and that a progressive increase in logistics related activity can be expected. While no personnel infiltration groups bound for South Vietnam-Cambodia were detected during the past week, and the estimate of infiltrators since 1 October 1971 remains at some 2,300-3,000, the Communists have continued to strengthen their forces in Laos. This week, only two small, special purpose groups were noted destined for south Laos. Additionally, there is tenuous evidence that some elements of the 308th NVA Division may also be preparing to move into south Laos, probably to augment the combat forces protecting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The North Vietnamese, moreover, have continued to dispatch infiltration groups and materiel to north Laos with the two additional groups detected during the week raising the estimate of infiltrators to that area since 15 October to some 4,800-5,300.

South Vietnam Developments

On 15 November, President Thieu made public an economic reform package that is designed to promote economic development, encourage greater self-reliance, and provide additional revenues. Among the major changes are a substantial devaluation of the piaster (from 31 to 70 percent, depending on the type of transaction), a reform of the tax structure, a reduction in import and export taxes, the creation of a development fund, and a substantial pay raise for Civil Service and military personnel. The minor changes include the issuance of a new 1000-piaster note. Those measures which can be implemented by decree will become effective on 18 November. Some of the proposed reform measures will be unpopular. In recent months, the rice markets have produced a rising price problem, and the reforms will create additional upward pressure on prices. This, in addition to the recent U.S. Senate action on the foreign aid bill, has induced considerable apprehension on the part of South Vietnamese as to their economic future, which has already been reflected in Saigon's money markets.

Communist Developments

A Hanoi press article and two recent COSVN directives reflect concern over the Communist's position in the countryside. An 11 November article in Quan Doi Nhan Dan (Peoples Army), the North Vietnamese Army organ, acknowledged some "temporary realities" in the South Vietnamese government's pacification successes, as measured in the opening and unhindered use of roads in South Vietnam and the increase in the number of hamlets secured. After saying that these security indicators are no proof of Saigon's pacification success, the article said that the "temporary realities" are due to the fact that "the regional people are not sufficiently vigilant and fail to cleverly combine various struggle methods." A paper prepared by the COSVN training section in early November emphasized that Party cadres and echelons must return to basic practices in countering South Vietnam's pacification effort. Another COSVN document, a directive dated 20 October, noted that government forces had seized Communist areas, relocated many people previously under Communist control as a result of ARVN's operations in the U Minh Forest, and it added that Saigon has the capability of maintaining security in its pacified areas. While the directive made a pro forma reference to "the inevitable failure" of the government's pacification efforts, it too prescribed a return to the basics and a firmer foundation in the Party's policies in order to overcome current Communist difficulties and problems.

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